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“Men must be able to assume that those with whom theydeal in the general intercourse of society will act in
good faith.”1  The principle of good faith enjoys a long history,
and the growth of the good faith doctrine was one of the “truly
major advances in American contract law” during the middle
part of the twentieth century.2  This advance was applauded by
many.  The recognition of the good faith doctrine was a “means
to ‘justice and to justice according to the law,’” allowing courts to
arrive at equitable outcomes without using covert means.3  How-
ever, one of the ongoing difficulties is providing meaning to the
term “good faith.”4  Despite this difficulty, the obligation to per-
form and enforce contracts in good faith was included in two im-
portant sources of the law promulgated in the second half of the
twentieth century.  After much debate and discussion, the Uni-
form Commercial Code was enacted, and included a section im-
posing a good faith requirement in both performance and
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2006.  Articles Editor, Or-
egon Law Review, 2005-06.  I would like to thank Professor Jim Mooney for his
editorial assistance and encouragement.
1 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code , 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 195 (1968) (citing R.
POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 188 (1922)).
2 Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and Con-
ceptualization , 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810 (1982) (recognizing the inclusion of
section 205 as an important improvement over first Restatement, approved in 1932,
which did not contain a Good Faith provision).
3 Id.  at 826 (quoting Summers, supra  note 1, at 198).
4 See, e.g. , Summers, supra  note 1, at 199-200 (discussing the difficulty in deter-
mining the intended meaning when a judge uses the term “good faith”).
[907]
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 2  7-FEB-06 13:33
908 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
enforcement of all contracts.5  This inclusion was viewed as reviv-
ing the ancient, but largely forgotten principle of good faith.6
The growth in prominence of the doctrine reached its peak with
its inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.7
The purpose of the good faith doctrine is to prohibit and pro-
vide remedy for improper behavior in the performance and en-
forcement of contracts.8  While at first glance this seems to be a
relatively simple rule, developing a comprehensive definition for
good faith has proven challenging, if not impossible.  Because the
doctrine is implied into every contract, it is used in a wide variety
of contexts and its definition often varies as the context changes.9
Given this definitional difficulty, Professor Summers has argued
that good faith is best conceptualized as an “excluder,” providing
meaning for the term by ruling out various acts of “bad faith”
according to the context.10  This approach, first put forward by
Professor Summers in an influential 1968 article, was also
adopted in the Restatement (Second).11  While the Restatement
5 U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004).
6 E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code , 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963)
7 See  Summers, supra  note 2, at 812.  Professor Summers listed five reasons that
section 205 represented a major advance in contract law: (1) it reflected a large
volume of case law and statutory development; (2) it, along with other equitable
principles, represents a fundamental objective of the legal system – “justice, and
justice according to law;” (3) although merely a minimal requirement, the good faith
obligation is relevant in a wide variety of contractual matters, and it accordingly
rules out bad faith in a diverse array of contexts; (4) the section embodies a general
requirement to which judges can turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and
duties; and (5) because section 205 is a direct and explicit requirement, judges no
longer need resort to covert means to redress bad faith. Id.  at 811-12.
8 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303, Or. 557, 562, 739 P.2d 554, 557 (1987).
9 Id.  at 562, 739 P.2d at 557; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context.”).
10 Summers, supra  note 2, at 816-21.  In another article, Professor Summers pro-
vided a number of forms of bad faith conduct, and the meaning of good faith that
would be derived from that conduct.  Summers, supra note 1, at 203.  Some exam-
ples include: Form of Bad Faith – “seller concealing a defect in what he is selling;”
Meaning of Good Faith – “fully disclosing material facts;” Bad Faith – “contractor
openly abusing bargaining power to coerce an increase in the contract price;” Good
Faith – “refraining from abuse of bargaining power;” Bad Faith – “arbitrarily and
capriciously exercising a power to terminate a contract;” Good Faith – “acting with
some reason.” Id.  tbl. 1.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“Good faith per-
formance . . . excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad
faith’. . . .”); Id.  at cmt. d (providing examples of certain actions or inactions that are
considered bad faith).  Professor Summers’ article was, indeed, influential.  Robert
Braucher, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School at the time, was the Reporter
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(Second) did not attempt a definition of good faith, the reporter
did list the general purposes of section 205: securing “faithfulness
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party,” and compliance with “commu-
nity standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”12  In at-
tempting to give meaning to the good faith obligation by
excluding bad faith, ensuring that agreements remain consistent
with the parties’ reasonable expectations, and insuring compli-
ance with community standards and fairness, the implied obliga-
tion of good faith reflects a very simple idea: Some expectations
may be so fundamental or obvious to contractual parties that
they neither discuss them in the negotiation process nor demand
that they be reduced to writing.13
Unfortunately, in the years since the inclusion of the good
faith provision in the Restatement (Second), many judicial opin-
ions, including those of the Oregon Supreme Court, have eroded
the strength and usefulness of the historical doctrine.  This Com-
ment will focus on the treatment of the implied obligation of
good faith in Oregon courts.  The first Part will discuss the evolu-
tion of the obligation as required under the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  The second
Part will then turn to an examination of the current narrow
meaning of the common law good faith obligation in Oregon.
Part III will examine a number of cases that have followed the
narrow Oregon rule, and predictably, resulted in harsh outcomes.
The final two Parts, however, will shift direction.  Part IV will
discuss recent Oregon decisions that have interpreted good faith
as a broad obligation in the performance of contracts.  This inter-
pretation is similar to the way the Oregon courts viewed the obli-
gation before the string of narrowing decisions handed down in
the mid-nineties.  Finally, Part V will conclude by suggesting a
method to return the obligation of good faith to a prominent po-
sition in Oregon law.
for the Restatement (Second) during the years that section 205 came to life.  Profes-
sor Braucher acknowledged that The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition
and Conceptualization  “substantially influenced the recognition and conceptualiza-
tion” of the good faith requirement in the second Restatement. See  Summers, supra
note 2, at 810.
12 Summers, supra  note 2, at 821 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 cmt. a (1981)).
13 Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith , 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1274 (1999).
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Professor Farnsworth, in an article discussing the Uniform
Commercial Code’s obligation of good faith, and what he viewed
as the “great fall” of the general obligation in Uniform Commer-
cial Code Article 1, stated that it would be in the hands of the
courts to ensure the obligation’s future vitality.14  He wrote:
“[w]hether all the King’s horses and all the King’s men can put
the obligation together again is a matter for the judiciary.”15
There is evidence that at least some Oregon courts are rising to
the occasion.
I
THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOOD
FAITH DOCTRINE
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant history of the
good faith doctrine began in 1957, the year in which the complete
text of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and its com-
ments were first published.16  While the main focus of this Com-
ment is the good faith obligation found in Oregon common law,
the inclusion of a good faith requirement in the U.C.C. was an
14 Farnsworth, supra  note 6, at 674.
15 Id.
16 For an in-depth history of the early notions of good faith, and the early devel-
opment of the good faith standards in both English law and American law, see
James A. Webster, Comment, A Pound of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme Court Virtu-
ally Eliminates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith , 75 OR. L.
REV. 493, 497-509 (1996).  Webster traces the history of the good faith obligation all
the way back to Old Testament times, then follows it as it evolves and grows during
the early Greek and Classical Roman periods. Id.  at 497-98.  Webster continues by
discussing good faith as it developed first in the English equity courts, and eventu-
ally the law courts. Id.  at 499-501.  Eventually, commercial law saw justice and fair-
ness as the most fundamental aspects of any exchange, and courts undertook a fact-
based inquiry into both the honesty of the parties and the reasonableness of their
actons in the specific context in which the actions were undertaken. Id.  at 502.  This
broad and equitable notion of the good faith doctrine eroded as society began to
industrialize.  Along with that change came a perceived need for efficiency and cer-
tainty. Id.  at 504.  The result was a turning away from the inquiry into subjective
meeting of the minds and the requirement of mutual assent, toward an objective
view of the four corners of the contract. Id.  Over time, many courts reacted to the
failure of these strict rules to keep pace with the true nature of commercial transac-
tions, by finding imaginative ways to achieve equitable results, even within the for-
malist structure of the law. Id.  at 507.  These developments coincided with the
growth of the legal realist movement, which conceived of the law not as a fixed
system of strict rules, but as flexible guidelines which should reflect and facilitate
actual practices. Id.  at 508-09.  It was at this point in legal history that the drafters of
the U.C.C. found themselves.
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important first step in re-energizing the idea of good faith in
American contract law.  The U.C.C. was promulgated in order
to, inter alia , simplify and make uniform the law governing com-
mercial transactions.17  By including the good faith obligation in
such an important and far-reaching document,18 the U.C.C. solid-
ified the obligation’s position as an important requirement of
American law.
U.C.C. Article 1 contains the general requirement that
“[e]very contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”19  The
official comment that follows the section acknowledges that it
“sets forth a basic principle running throughout the [U.C.C.].”20
The definition provided for good faith is “honesty in fact and  the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing.”21  Out of the nine articles of the U.C.C., good faith is de-
fined in seven.22  All but one of those definitions identifies good
faith in the same manner that it is presently defined in Article
1.23  Under the U.C.C., it is clear that the good faith obligation is
meant to ensure that parties to a contract act in an honest and
up-front manner with one another and that their behavior is rea-
sonable within the context their actions occur.  Roughly twenty
years after the good faith obligation was included in the U.C.C., a
second major source of contract law was handed down.
B. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is found
in Chapter 9, titled “The Scope of Contractual Obligations.”24
The good faith obligation falls under the second topic of chapter
17 U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2004).
18 The Code has been adopted in some form by every state except Louisiana.  Joel
Iglesias, Comment, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Franchises , 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1423, 1433-34 (2004) (citing E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 32 (3d ed. 1999)).
19 U.C.C. § 1-304.
20 Id.  cmt. 1.
21 Id.  § 1-201(20) (emphasis added).  This definition differs from the original pre-
revision definition in that it contains the objective commercial reasonableness stan-
dard.  This is a rather significant change and is discussed further infra  Part I.C.
22 Id.  Only Articles 6 and 7 fail to define good faith. Id.
23 Id.  Article 5 is the only article that uses an alternative definition.  Article 5
defines good faith solely in terms of subjective honesty. Id.
24 ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY – SE-
LECTED PROVISIONS: RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS AND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 25 (3d ed. 2003).
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9, Considerations of Fairness and the Public Interest .25  The lan-
guage of section 205 simply states, “[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its per-
formance and its enforcement.”26  An attempt to add some defi-
nition to the requirement is made in the official comments that
follow it.  Comment a reviews the U.C.C. definition stating that
good faith means “honesty in fact and the observance of reasona-
ble commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”27  The
comment continues, “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement
of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common pur-
pose  and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party.”28  This comment also explicitly adopts Professor Sum-
mers’ “excluder” definition.29  Comment a refers to an objective
standard, stating that some actions are bad faith because “they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness.”30  Accordingly, as defined in comment a, the Restatement
(Second) includes both an objective and subjective good faith ob-
ligation.  Comment d further points out that subjective good faith
alone will not always  be sufficient to satisfy the good faith
obligation.31
The inclusion of the good faith obligation in section 205 was a
very important advance.  Because the American Law Institute,
the institutional author of the various restatements, is comprised
of distinguished professors, judges, and practitioners, courts gen-
erally give the assorted restatements tremendous respect.32
Some even regard these formulations as “the law.”33  Therefore,
the express inclusion of the good faith obligation provided a tool
for courts to decide cases, taking into account their own sense of
equity and fairness.
Of course, the inclusion of section 205 was not without its crit-
25 Id.
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
27 Id.  cmt. a.  The comment also includes the purely subjective “honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned” definition from Article 1 of the original code.
Id.  Article 1 has since been revised, and the Article 1 definition is now the same as
is found in Article 2. See infra  Part I.C.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a.
29 Id.  (“[Good faith] excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as in-
volving ‘bad faith.’”).
30 Id.
31 Id.  at cmt. d (“Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified.”).
32 Summers, supra note 2, at 812.
33 Id.
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ics.34  Nonetheless, the section was accepted, in part because
there was ample authority for its inclusion.  The obligation of
good faith was repeatedly recognized in American case law.35  In
particular, the important state courts of New York and California
rendered decisions allowing relief for various forms of bad
faith.36  Additionally, good faith’s inclusion in the Restatement
(Second) was supported by the obligation’s inclusion in the
U.C.C.37
C. Subjective or Objective Good Faith?
One of the early, and often ongoing, difficulties with the mod-
ern good faith obligation was determining whether the standard
was one of subjective or objective good faith.38
A subjective good faith requirement requires only that a party
“honestly” believe it is acting properly.39  The test for subjective
good faith is sometimes referred to as “the rule of ‘the pure heart
and the empty head.’”40  An objective good faith requirement
insists upon the additional element that the parties’ actions be
reasonable.41  These relatively clear definitions, however, can
lead to considerable confusion in application.
While it has been held that subjective honesty alone is not nec-
essarily sufficient to establish good faith,42 there do seem to be
factual circumstances under which one test (objective or subjec-
tive) will carry much greater weight in a court’s decision.  In a
paper he presented at a seminar in Rome in 1993, Professor
Farnsworth illustrated this by providing the following example:
Suppose that you are a publisher and I am a printer and we
make a contract under which I am to print some books for you
34 Id.  at 825-30 (addressing some criticisms including the rationales underlying the
good faith requirement, the “Excluder” analysis, and the general indefinability of
good faith).
35 Id.  at 812-13.
36 Id.  at 812.
37 Id.  at 813.  Some commentators, especially Professor Summers, viewed the Re-
statement (Second) version of the good faith obligation as a vast improvement on
the original version of the obligation contained in the Code. See id.  at 824-25.
38 See generally  Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 671-74.
39 Allan E. Farnsworth [sic], The Concept of “Good Faith” in American Law , 10
CENTRE FOR COMPARATIVE AND FOREIGN LAW STUDIES SAGGI, CONFERENZE E
SEMINARI 7 (1993) (It.), available at  http://soi.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/farnswrt.htm.
40 Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code , 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812 (1958).
41 Farnsworth, supra note 39, at 7.
42 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557, 563, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (1987).
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and you are to take them and pay me if you are “satisfied”
with my printing.  The contract gives you some discretion in
deciding whether you are “satisfied.”  You have to exercise
that discretion in good faith . . . . [B]ecause it is not so difficult
to judge the quality of printing, the test should be objective:
Ought you reasonably to have been satisfied with my printing?
If a jury decides that you ought reasonably to have been satis-
fied, the court will hold that you have broken our contract
even if you were honestly not satisfied .
Now suppose that you are a publisher and I am an author
and we make a contract under which I am to write a novel for
you and you are to publish it and pay me royalties if you are
“satisfied” with my novel . . . . Suppose you refuse to publish
my novel . . . . [A] court is likely to decide that the test should
be purely subjective: Were you honestly not satisfied with the
quality of my novel?  The judge will not ask . . . whether you
ought reasonably to have been dissatisfied with my novel .43
As Farnsworth’s example illustrates, there are clearly some sit-
uations that mandate reliance on one test over the other.
The distinction between the subjective and objective tests was
highly important after the original promulgation of the U.C.C.
The original U.C.C. Article 1 defined good faith simply as “hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”44  This defi-
nition applied throughout the U.C.C., with one exception:
Former Article 2 provided that in that Article, “good faith in the
case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”45
Thus, the general good faith obligation was exclusively subjec-
tive, but the specific good faith obligation for merchants added
an objective inquiry to the test.46  However, over time various
amendments and revisions brought the merchant version of good
faith into other articles of the U.C.C.47  Given these develop-
ments, the drafting committee of the revised Article 1 decided it
was appropriate to bring the broader obligation of good faith
43 Farnsworth, supra note 39, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
44 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1958).
45 U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 20 (2004).
46 Professor Farnsworth argued that the deletion of the objective test from earlier
versions of the code was a terrible error in the final product.  Farnsworth, supra note
6, at 673-74.  Farnsworth acknowledged that compromise and accommodation were
necessary to gain support for a huge enterprise such as the U.C.C., but also urged
courts to take it upon themselves to restore the objective standard to the entire
Code. Id.  at 674.
47 U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 20.
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into Article 1.48  Accordingly, now both the revised U.C.C. and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts contain a definition of
the good faith obligation with both a subjective and an objective
test.
With this brief introduction to the good faith obligation and its
conceptualization and recognition in modern American law, I
will now explore the interesting, often confusing, and sometimes
surprising realm of the good faith obligation as interpreted by the
Oregon courts.
II
THE IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH
IN OREGON
The decision most often cited in Oregon for establishing the
proposition that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is im-
plied in every contract is Perkins v. Standard Oil .49  In that case,
the Oregon Supreme Court held that Standard Oil had an im-
plied duty not to solicit its distributor’s customers, even though
the parties’ contract provided Standard Oil with complete discre-
tion in selecting its own customers.50  The court based this deci-
sion on the one-sided and completely inequitable nature of the
contract.51  If Standard Oil was at liberty to solicit Perkins’ cus-
tomers, Perkins would have been “in a state of economic servil-
ity,” a situation the court refused to believe was the intended
result at the time the contract was signed.52  By deciding the case
in favor of Perkins, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged
that the express terms of a contract will not be enforced if they
do not conform to the implied obligation of good faith. Perkins
would remain the common law good faith standard in Oregon
for twenty-four years, until the court decided Best v. United
States National Bank of Oregon .
48 Id.  The broad “merchant” definition is now only limited by Article 5’s narrow
definition. Id.
49 Perkins v. Standard Oil, 235 Or. 7, 16, 383 P.2d 107, 112 (1963) (quoting 3
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 278 (1993)); see Or. Univ. Sys. v. Or. Pub. Employees
Union, Local 503, 185 Or. App. 506, 514, 60 P.3d 567, 571 (2002) (stating that “[i]n
Perkins  . . . , the Oregon Supreme Court first recognized that every contract includes
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).
50 Perkins , 235 Or. at 10-15, 383 P.2d at 109-11.
51 Id.  at 16, 383 P.2d at 112.
52 Id.  at 17, 383 P.2d at 112.
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A. The Best Formulation
In 1987, the Oregon Supreme Court decided Best v. United
States National Bank of Oregon .53  Between the years of 1973
and 1979, the bank had increased its fee for nonsufficient fund
(NSF) checks from $3 to $5 for every “bad” check written.54  The
Bests were among the bank’s customers who were charged this
fee, and they brought a lawsuit, individually and as representa-
tives of a similarly situated class of bank customers.55  The suit
alleged the bank’s fees were unlawful because they greatly ex-
ceeded the costs the bank incurred for processing the NSF
checks.56  The customers’ central claim was that the high fees
breached the bank’s obligation to set fees in good faith.57
The class alleged that the bank had an obligation to set fees in
good faith, but that the bank had breached this obligation by set-
ting fees that were excessive in relation to the cost to the bank.58
The court acknowledged that although there was nothing in the
account agreements that expressly limited the bank’s authority to
set fees, all  contracts have an obligation for the parties to per-
form in good faith.59  This obligation, the court reasoned, limited
the bank’s apparently unlimited authority.60  The court, following
the Restatement and its own precedent in Perkins,  held that
when a party has discretion, that discretion must be exercised
within the confines of the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties.61  Importantly, the Best court stated that it was not necessa-
rily sufficient that the bank acted honestly.62  The good faith
obligation requires more.  Taking this statement into account, the
Best court expressly stated that the common law obligation to
act in good faith requires not only a subjective inquiry into the
53 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557, 739 P.2d 554 (1987).
54 Id.  at 559, 739 P.2d at 555.
55 Id.  at 559, 739 P.2d at 555.
56 Id.  at 559, 739 P.2d at 555.
57 Id.  at 559, 739 P.2d at 555.  Originally, the Bests alleged six claims for relief.
Three of those claims were certified as class actions by the circuit court: “(1) that the
[b]ank breached its obligation to set NSF fees in good faith, (2) that its NSF fees
were unconscionable, and (3) that its NSF fees were an unlawful penalty for breach
of contract.” Id.  at 559, 739 P.2d at 555.  The court quickly dismissed the unlawful
penalty and unconsionability claims, and focused on the good faith issue. Id.  at 560-
61, 739 P.2d at 556-57.
58 Id.  at 561, 739 P.2d at 556-57.
59 Id.  at 561, 739 P.2d at 557.
60 Id.  at 561, 739 P.2d at 557.
61 Id.  at 564, 739 P.2d at 558.
62 Id.  at 564, 739 P.2d at 558.
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honesty in fact of the parties, but also an objective inquiry into
the reasonable expectations of the parties involved.
Accordingly, the rule from Best  can be summarized as follows:
(1) the obligation to act in good faith is implied into all agree-
ments, and the express terms of the agreement, even when fol-
lowed, will not control the outcome of a dispute if the terms are
not performed or enforced in good faith; and (2) the inquiry into
good faith requires the court to examine the subjective mindset
of the parties, as well as an objective investigation of their rea-
sonable expectations.63
B. Tolbert, Pacific First & Uptown Heights: Tightening the
Noose on the Good Faith Doctrine
It was not long before the Oregon Supreme Court began to
retreat from the broad and equitable rule of Best , toward a more
restrictive, classical view of the good faith doctrine.64  On De-
cember 19, 1991, the court handed down its decision in Tolbert v.
First National Bank of Oregon .65 Tolbert also dealt with the
right of a bank to set and adjust the fee charged for NSF
checks.66  The case began as a companion to Best , and the court’s
opinion started with an examination of its decision in that case.67
The court reaffirmed the general rule that “there is an obligation
of good faith in the performance and enforcement of every con-
tract,”68 and reiterated the central holding from Best :  that
“whether a specified price violates the obligation of good faith
should be decided by the reasonable contractual expectations of
the parties,” and the fact that a party acted honestly is “not nec-
essarily sufficient” to satisfy its good faith obligation.69
After summarizing the Best  decision, the Tolbert court contin-
ued by pointing out that there were two important factual differ-
ences that distinguished Tolbert  from Best .70  First, unlike the
bank in Best , the bank in Tolbert followed the practice of inform-
ing its customers of the bank’s current NSF fee when an account
63 Id.  at 564-65, 739 P.2d at 558-59.
64 Webster, supra  note 16, at 525-25.  Webster’s excellent comment discussed the
post-Best  retreat from the broad view of the good faith obligation in Oregon.  Signif-
icantly, Webster’s comment is something of a starting point for this Comment.
65 Tolbert v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., 312 Or. 485, 823 P.2d 965 (1991).
66 Id.  at 488, 823 P.2d at 966.
67 Id.  at 488, 823 P.2d at 967.
68 Id.  at 488, 823 P.2d at 967.
69 Id.  at 489, 823 P.2d at 967.
70 Id.  at 490, 823 P.2d at 968.
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was opened.71  Second, the bank in Tolbert informed its cus-
tumers by mail of changes in their service at or near the time that
the changes were made.72  The plaintiffs argued that these factual
distinctions did not have legal significance and that Best should
dictate a result in their favor.73  The bank responded that the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties are irrelevant  when the depos-
itors were made aware of the fees, but agreed to open their
accounts anyway.74
The court agreed with the bank, specifically stating that “[t]he
expectations of depositors are irrelevant if they have agreed to
the NSF fees charged by the bank.”75  The court explicitly ac-
knowledged that if a party is granted discretion by the express
terms of a contract and exercises that discretion after prior no-
tice, as a matter of law the parties’ reasonable expectations will
be met.76  Thus, under Tolbert , the good faith limitation to a
party’s apparently unlimited discretion established in Best  was
narrowed significantly when the court held that a party exercising
unrestricted discretion by the express terms of an agreement sat-
isfies the good faith obligation as a matter of law.77
In decisions that came down in 1994 and 1995, the Oregon Su-
preme Court further solidified the narrow view of good faith it
had established in Tolbert .  First, in 1994, the court decided Pa-
cific First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp .78  Pacific First Fed-
eral Savings (PFFB) was a tenant in a building owned by New
Morgan Park.79  On July 30, 1990, PFFB sent notice to New Mor-
71 Id.  at 490, 823 P.2d at 968.
72 Id.  at 491, 823 P.2d at 968.
73 Id.  at 491, 823 P.2d at 968.
74 Id.  at 491, 823 P.2d at 968.
75 Id.  at 492, 823 P.2d at 969.
76 Id.  at 494, 823 P.2d at 970.  In a footnote, the Tolbert court abandoned another
important part of the Best decision.  The court stated that it is only the “common
law ‘objective’ good faith standard which is applicable in this case.” Id.  at 494 n.6,
823 P.2d at 970 n.6.  This appears to ignore the holding in Best that required both
subjective and objective good faith. See Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557,
564, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (1987); see also supra Part II.A.
77 Tolbert , 312 Or. at 494, 823 P.2d at 970.
78 Pac. First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp., 319 Or. 342, 876 P.2d 761 (1994).
The majority opinion in Pacific First  was authored by then Justice Graber.  Judge
Graber currently sits on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  An interesting fact is
that Judge Graber was the author of an amicus curiae brief in the Best  case.  She
wrote the brief on behalf of First Interstate Bank of Oregon, and given who her
client was, presumably argued against the broad good faith obligation that case
established.
79 Id.  at 344, 876 P.2d at 762.
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gan Park that it planned to merge into its wholly owned subsidi-
ary, Pacific First Bank.80  The lease agreement required New
Morgan Park’s consent prior to any change of control.81  After
the merger, New Morgan Park informed PFFB that the merger
was an assignment without consent and that PFFB was in viola-
tion of the lease.82  PFFB filed suit for declaration that it became
the tenant in compliance with the lease, and New Morgan Park
countersued to recover possession of the property.83  The trial
court concluded that the merger did not  require consent, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that “the merger was an ‘as-
signment’ requiring consent of Landlord and that failure to ob-
tain that consent was a material breach of the lease
agreement.”84
After agreeing with the court of appeals by determining that
the merger was a “transfer” within the meaning of the lease
agreement, thus requiring consent on the part of New Morgan
Park,85 the Oregon Supreme Court went on to examine PFFB’s
claim that New Morgan Park should not be able to withhold such
consent unreasonably.  The court cited the reasonable expecta-
tions test from Best ; however, it also cited Tolbert , for the rule
that when a contract provides for a unilateral exercise of discre-
tion, reasonable expectations are met when that discretion is ex-
ercised after notice.86  The court further stated that “the
obligation of good faith does not vary the substantive terms of
the bargain . . . , nor does it provide a remedy for an unpleasantly
motivated act . . . .”87  The court turned to the express terms of
the contract, which required prior written consent before trans-
ferring the lease, and determined that PFFB “could not have had
an objectively reasonable expectation  that [New Morgan Park’s]
right to grant or withhold consent to the transfer of the lease . . .
was constrained in the manner suggested by [PFFB].”88
80 Id.  at 345, 876 P.2d at 763.
81 Id.  at 345, 876 P.2d at 763.
82 Id.  at 345, 876 P.2d at 763.
83 Id.  at 345-46, 876 P.2d at 763.
84 Id.  at 346, 876 P.2d at 763-64 (citing Pac. First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp.,
122 Or. App. 401, 857 P.2d 895 (1993)).
85 Id.  at 348-49, 876 P.2d at 764-65.
86 Id.  at 351-52, 876 P.2d at 766-67 (citing Tolbert v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., 312
Or. 485, 823 P.2d 965, 970 (1991)).
87 Id.  at 352-53, 876 P.2d at 767 (citing U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Boge, 311 Or. 550, 567,
814 P.2d 1082, 1092 (1991)).
88 Id.  at 354, 876 P.2d at 768 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court in Pacific First  reaf-
firmed the narrow holding of Tolbert , that good faith does not
limit discretion provided by the express terms of the contract,
and further added the restriction that the good faith obligation
does not even provide a remedy for a bad act if that act is al-
lowed by the contract.
Less than one year later, the Oregon Supreme Court faced the
good faith issue again in Uptown Heights Associates, L.P. v.
Seafirst Corp .89  The case involved a $7.5 million90 loan from a
bank to a developer, Uptown, to be used to construct a “high-
end” apartment complex in Portland, Oregon.91  Under the terms
of the loan, Uptown was to pay monthly interest payments until
the loan matured, at which time the principal amount would be
due.92  The loan agreement had a provision which allowed for
two six-month extensions.93  Due to a drop in the rental market,
Uptown began to experience financial problems, which made it
difficult to meet their financial obligation to the bank.94  The
bank agreed to the first extension, but, despite promises they
would work with Uptown to resolve any problems surrounding
the loan, refused to grant the second six-month extension.95
After refusing the extension, the bank transferred the Uptown
loan to a special department for problem loans, and bank person-
nel began to threaten foreclosure.96  In an effort to avoid the im-
measurable harm to its investment and business reputation that
would result from foreclosure, Uptown began to seek a buyer.97
Uptown received an offer on the apartment complex, but just
two days after Uptown informed the bank of the offer, the bank
initiated a foreclosure action.98  As a result, the offeror did not
proceed any further.99  A few months after a receiver was ap-
pointed by the court, Uptown was able to secure a second offer
for the apartment complex, which would have resulted in a price
89 Uptown Heights Assocs., L.P. v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or. 638, 891 P.2d 639
(1995).
90 Id.  at 641-42, 891 P.2d at 641.
91 Id.  at 641, 891 P.2d at 641.
92 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
93 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
94 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
95 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
96 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
97 Id.  at 642, 891 P.2d at 642.
98 Id.  at 643, 891 P.2d at 642.
99 Id.  at 643, 891 P.2d at 642.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 15  7-FEB-06 13:33
All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men 921
of $8.1-8.6 million, an amount well over the outstanding amount
on Uptown’s loan.100  Still, the bank refused on multiple occa-
sions to extend the scheduled foreclosure sale.101  Uptown and
the second buyer were unable to work out a deal that would sat-
isfy the bank’s strict timeline, and the foreclosure sale took
place.102  Surprisingly, the bank was the winning bidder at the
sale, and it quickly entered into a deal with the second potential
buyer.103  Uptown, of course, received nothing.
Uptown sued the bank, alleging, inter alia , that the bank
breached its good faith obligation by refusing the second exten-
sion and continuing the foreclosure, even though Uptown had
located a buyer who was going to pay more than the outstanding
loan amount.104  In affirming the dismissal of Uptown’s good
faith claim, the court relied on Tolbert and rejected Uptown’s
attempt to rely on the standard from Best .105  The court stated:
[I]f a written contract between the parties expressly allows for
a particular remedy by one of the parties, in the face of a spec-
ified breach, the parties’ objectively “reasonable expectations”
under the contract include the invocation of that remedy in
the face of that breach.  The party invoking its express, written
contractual right does not, merely by so doing, violate its duty
of good faith.106
This ruling had the effect of further solidifying the rule that
parties’ reasonable expectations are determined by the express
terms of their contract in a good faith inquiry.
C. A Summary of the Status of Good Faith in Oregon
The vitality of Oregon’s good faith doctrine reached its peak
when the Oregon Supreme Court announced a broad and equita-
ble good faith obligation in Best .  The Oregon Supreme Court,
however, severely weakened that broad rule by issuing a series of
decisions restricting the reach of the good faith obligation.  The
court in Best stated that the primary purpose of the good faith
doctrine was to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties to a contract.107  Accordingly, when a party is authorized to
100 Id.  at 643, 891 P.2d at 642.
101 Id.  at 643, 891 P.2d at 642.
102 Id.  at 643, 891 P.2d at 642.
103 Id.  at 643-44, 891 P.2d at 642.
104 Id.  at 644, 891 P.2d at 642-43.
105 Id.  at 644-46, 891 P.2d at 643-44.
106 Id.  at 645, 891 P.2d at 643.
107 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557, 563, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (1987).
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use discretion in the performance of a contract, as the bank in
Best  was, but the actual outcome from the use of the discretion is
not within the reasonable expectations of the parties, the discre-
tion has been exercised in bad faith.108  Simply put, a party’s ap-
parently unlimited freedom to act under the express terms of a
contract is limited by the implied obligation that the party act in
good faith, according to both parties’ reasonable expectations at
the time the contract was created.109
Shortly after announcing this broad rule, the Oregon Supreme
Court began the process of narrowing the good faith doctrine.
First, in Tolbert , the court severely narrowed the reasonable ex-
pectations test of Best , limiting the inquiry only to the objectively
reasonable expectations of the parties.110  Under Best , a party’s
authority to act is restricted even when it appears they have un-
limited discretion, but, under the significantly more narrow doc-
trine of Tolbert , a party exercising unlimited discretion according
to the express terms of a contract satisfies its duty of good faith
as a matter of law.111  The later decisions in Pacific First Bank
and Uptown Heights reaffirmed and strengthened this narrow
view of good faith.112  Accordingly, by the middle of the 1990s,
the Oregon Supreme Court had crafted a narrow good faith doc-
trine.  As one judge observed, in the cases that came after its
decision in Best , the Oregon Supreme Court had “relegated the
implied covenant of good faith . . . to some sort of legal museum
for former remedies that are no longer used.”113
D. Selected Outcomes Under Oregon’s Narrow Good
Faith Obligation
In the years since the Oregon Supreme Court crafted its nar-
row version of the good faith obligation, a number of Oregon
Court of Appeals cases have followed the Tolbert , Pacific First ,
and Uptown Heights rulings.  In doing so, many of the courts
have furthered the emasculation of the good faith obligation in
108 Id.  at 563, 739 P.2d at 558.
109 See id.  at 561, 739 P.2d at 557.
110 Tolbert v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., 312 Or. 485, 494, 823 P.2d 965, 970 (1991).
111 Id.  at 494, 823 P.2d at 970.
112 Pac. First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp., 319 Or. 342, 354, 876 P.2d 761, 768
(1994); Uptown Heights Assocs., L.P. v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or. 638, 645, 891 P.2d
639, 643 (1995).
113 In re  Porter, 320 Or. 692, 711, 890 P.2d 1377, 1388 (1995) (Fadely, J.,
concurring).
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Oregon.  Predictably, many of these cases have had rather harsh
results.
One such example is Zygar v. Johnson ,114 decided in 2000.
The defendant buyer entered into a contract with the sellers for
the purchase of a home in Springfield, Oregon.115  On the first
page of the agreement, under the caption “special conditions,”
the buyer’s realtor entered a handwritten provision that stated
the sale was, “subject to purchaser’s approval of a pest [and] dry-
rot report.”116  On the second page of the agreement, there was a
printed paragraph requiring a pest inspection and allowing the
buyer to terminate the agreement if the results were not ap-
proved, but also allowing the sellers to save the transaction by
repairing the defect.117
The property was inspected, and four days later the buyer’s
realtor informed the sellers’ realtor that he was no longer inter-
ested in the property.118  In that conversation, the buyer’s realtor
told the sellers’ realtor that the reason for the buyer’s desire to
discontinue the transaction was that the buyer’s fiance´e did not
like the house.119  A couple of days later the buyer’s realtor sent
a letter stating, inter alia , that the buyer refused to approve the
pest and dryrot report.120  Shortly after this initial letter, the
buyer’s attorney sent two letters to the sellers’ attorney, setting
forth the buyer’s reason for not approving the report and reiter-
ating the buyer’s intention to terminate the deal.121
The sellers brought an action for breach of contract, and after
unsuccessful arbitration, the buyer moved for summary judg-
ment, which the trial court granted.122  On appeal, the sellers put
forth two arguments:  (1) that the contract was ambiguous be-
cause the handwritten term allowed for termination, while the
printed term allowed the sellers to fix the damage and move on
with the sale; and (2) that there was a question of fact as to
whether the buyer executed his right to terminate the contract in
good faith—specifically, whether disapproval of the report was
114 Zygar v. Johnson, 169 Or. App. 638, 10 P.3d 326 (2000).
115 Id.  at 640, 10 P.3d at 327.
116 Id.  at 640, 10 P.3d at 327.
117 Id.  at 640-41, 10 P.3d at 327.
118 Id.  at 641, 10 P.3d at 327.
119 Id.  at 641, 10 P.3d at 327.  The fact that buyer’s fiance´e did not like the house
was confirmed in her deposition testimony. Id.  at 645, 10 P.3d at 330.
120 Id.  at 641, 10 P.3d at 327.
121 Id.  at 641, 10 P.3d at 327-28.
122 Id.  at 642, 10 P.3d at 328.
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“a ‘pretext’ and that the buyer’s ‘real motivation’ for terminating
the contract was that his fiance´e did not like the property.”123
The court first decided the issue of the alleged ambiguity.  The
court stated that the two provisions (one allowing the buyer the
unqualified right to terminate, the other allowing the seller an
opportunity to repair the damage and save the agreement) would
create an ambiguity if there were no basis to choose between
them.124  However, Oregon has enacted a statute relating to the
interpretation of a contract, which states that a handwritten term
prevails over a term printed on a form.125  Accordingly, the court
held that the buyer had the right to terminate the agreement on
the basis of his disapproval of the pest and dryrot report, and was
not required to allow the seller the opportunity to repair the
damage.126
The court then moved to the issue of whether or not the
buyer’s termination of the agreement was made in good faith.
The sellers again put forth the argument, supported by both the
statement of the the buyer’s realtor and the deposition testimony
of the buyer’s fiance´e, that the buyer’s true reason for rejecting
the contract had nothing to do with the report.127  The buyer
countered by arguing that the contract explicitly stated that he
could terminate the agreement if he disapproved of the pest re-
port, that he did disapprove of the report, and that the existence
of other reasons for his dissatisfaction is not a proper basis upon
which to conclude that he violated his good faith obligation.128
The court began its discussion by stating that while all con-
tracts contain an implied obligation of good faith and fair deal-
ing, an implied covenant “cannot contradict an express
contractual term, nor otherwise provide a remedy for an unpleas-
antly motivated act that is permitted expressly by the contract .”129
The seller did not dispute that the inspection report identified
some problems with the house, but argued that the buyer would
have been content with the seller’s offer to make repairs if his
fiance´e had liked the house.130  However, the court determined
123 Id.  at 642, 10 P.3d at 328.
124 See id.  at 642-44, 10 P.3d at 328-29.
125 Id.  at 644, 10 P.3d at 329 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 42.270 (2003)).
126 Id.  at 644, 10 P.3d at 329.
127 Id.  at 645, 10 P.3d at 329-30.
128 Id.  at 645, 10 P.3d at 330.
129 Id.  at 645, 10 P.3d at 330 (emphasis added).
130 Id.  at 646, 10 P.3d at 330.
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that even if this were true, that fact would not be material.131  In
essence, the court held that once the buyer became dissatisfied
with the inspection report he had the unqualified right to cancel
the transaction, regardless of what his true motivations were.132
Another example of the potential for harsh outcomes under
Oregon’s currently toothless good faith obligation is provided by
Richardson v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America .133  The
plaintiff, Richardson, was a dentist and sole shareholder in his
dental practice.134  He bought two business overhead expense
policies from defendant insurance company Guardian, through
defendant agent Bailey.135  The policies covered business over-
head in the event that the plaintiff became disabled.136  Written
in the pamphlet that accompanied the policy was the require-
ment that in order to qualify for coverage Richardson had to ei-
ther own twenty percent of the practice or “have a contractual
obligation” to pay the overhead expenses.137  Shortly after
purchasing the plan, Richardson’s health deteriorated and he en-
tered negotiations to sell all of his stock to one of his employees,
Dr. Keys, which would allow her to take over the practice.138
During negotiations for the sale, Richardson was told by Bailey
that the policy might cover the overhead post-sale, and later Bai-
ley told Richardson’s attorney that “the policies would  provide
that coverage.”139  Richardson entered into an agreement to sell
his stock, including a provision that he would cover the overhead
expenses for one year.140  The insurance company denied cover-
age a short time after the sale.141
Richardson made multiple claims,142 including assertions of a
131 Id.  at 646, 10 P.3d at 330.
132 Id.  at 647-48, 10 P.3d at 331.
133 Richardson v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 161 Or. App. 615, 984 P.2d 917
(1999).
134 Id.  at 617, 984 P.2d at 919.
135 Id.  at 617, 984 P.2d at 919-20.
136 Id.  at 617, 984 P.2d at 920.
137 Id.  at 618, 984 P.2d at 920.
138 Id.  at 618, 984 P.2d at 920.
139 See id.  at 618-19, 984 P.2d at 920.
140 Id.  at 619, 984 P.2d at 920.
141 Id.  at 619, 984 P.2d at 920.
142 In addition to his good faith claim against both defendants, the plaintiff alleged
breach of contract, estoppel to deny coverage, unfair claim settlement practices, bad
faith denial of coverage, intentional infliction of emotional distress against the insur-
ance company, and negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
agent Bailey. Id.  at 619, 984 P.2d at 920.
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violation of good faith and fair dealing against both the insurance
company and its agent, Bailey.143  After multiple motions by the
defendants, the trial court granted their motions for summary
judgment and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims.144
On appeal, the court of appeals first upheld the trial court’s
ruling that the defendant did not breach the insurance contract
by denying coverage.145  The court determined that the language
in a pamphlet stating that the plaintiff would be covered if he had
a contractual obligation to pay the overhead expenses (which he
did) was insufficient to make the otherwise clear terms of the
agreement ambiguous.146  Once the court determined there was
no breach, they cited Uptown Heights  and quickly affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the good faith claim against the insur-
ance company, stating that “any implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing must be consistent with the terms of a contract,
in this case the scope of coverage provided.”147
The court also affirmed the trial court’s decision that Bailey
was under no duty to advise the plaintiff about potential cover-
age problems arising out of the sale, and accordingly affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s good faith claim against Bailey.148  In
essence, the court decided that despite the representation of cov-
erage in the insurance pamphlet and the oral representation of
coverage by Bailey, as a matter of law there was no breach of
good faith in the insurance company’s denial of coverage.
A significant feature of both these cases is that the Oregon
Court of Appeals upheld a trial court grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs’ good faith claim.
On review of a grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals
must determine whether there is any dispute on any material fact ,
and the record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.149  Even with this high standard, because
of the narrow application of the good faith obligation, the courts
in these cases found, as a matter of law, that the implied obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing had not been breached.
It is clear from these outcomes that many Oregon courts have
143 Id.  at 619, 984 P.2d at 920.
144 Id.  at 619, 984 P.2d at 920-21.
145 Id.  at 623, 984 P.2d at 922-23.
146 Id.  at 623, 984 P.2d at 922-23.
147 Id.  at 624, 984 P.2d at 923.
148 Id.  at 628-29, 984 P.2d at 925-26.
149 OR. R. CIV. P. 47(c) (emphasis added).
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lost sight of the rule announced in Best , and in so doing have
abandoned the underlying purpose of the good faith obligation:
to provide for equitable and fair outcomes.
III
ARE OREGON COURTS REVITALIZING THE GOOD
FAITH OBLIGATION?
Justice Unis dissented from the decision in Pacific First  and
wrote a concurring opinion to Uptown Heights (only because he
agreed that it followed the precedent of the Pacific First decision
with which he disagreed).150  He wrote that the holdings in both
cases were wrong because they failed to further the purpose of
the good faith obligation as expressed in Best .151  He ended his
concurrence in Uptown Heights  by stating:  “I am hopeful that, in
the future, the court will reconsider its analysis and restore vital-
ity to the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing,
consistent with its purpose.”152 There is evidence that some Ore-
gon courts are doing just that.  While many cases, including those
discussed above, have followed the narrow version of the good
faith obligation advanced by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Tolbert and its progeny, not all cases have resulted in such harsh
outcomes.  In fact, given some recent cases there appears to be
reason to hope that the judiciary will resume its proper role in
ensuring that parties to contracts perform in good faith.
A. Brown v. American Property Management153
Mr. Brown worked as a leasing agent for American Property
Management (APM).154  Brown had a written commission agree-
ment with APM, which provided that he would be paid on the
basis of lease income for office space that he successfully
leased.155  On July 5, 1995, Brown delivered a letter to his super-
150 See  Uptown Heights Assocs., L.P. v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or. 638, 655, 891 P.2d
639, 649 (1995) (Unis, J., concurring); Pac. First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp.,
319 Or. 342, 356, 876 P.2d 761, 769 (1994) (Unis, J., dissenting).  Justice Fadeley
joined Justice Unis in both of these opinions.
151 Uptown Heights , 320 Or. at 655, 891 P.2d at 649 (Unis, J. concurring) (“The
purpose of the good faith . . . doctrine is to prohibit improper behavior in the per-
formance and enforcement of contracts.”(citation omitted)).
152 Id.  at 655, 891 P.2d at 649 (emphasis added).
153 Brown v. Am. Prop. Mgmt., 167 Or. App. 53, 1 P.3d 1051 (2000).
154 Id.  at 55, 1 P.3d at 1053.
155 Id.  at 55, 1 P.3d at 1053.
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visor, Vernon, alleging that he had not been paid for the success-
ful completion of several leases.156  Brown met with Vernon and
another person, Tschida, a couple of weeks later to try to resolve
the dispute.157  There was no resolution, and Brown and Vernon
agreed that Brown should not continue to work at APM until the
dispute could be resolved.158  Vernon followed up with a letter to
Brown confirming that he voluntarily agreed to stop working at
APM until the dispute over the commissions was resolved.159
Another week passed and Brown attempted to return to work,
but was told that he could not do so because he was on adminis-
trative leave status until his compensation issue was resolved.160
After more than a month passed without resolution, Mr. Brown
filed suit.161
After initially discussing Brown’s wrongful termination ac-
tion,162 the court turned to his breach of contract claims.  At is-
sue were commissions from two leases, and for the purposes of
the good faith analysis, it is the second lease with Hollywood Le-
gal Services that is relevant.  Hollywood was an existing tenant in
the property managed by APM.163  Brown negotiated a new
lease with Hollywood, which provided Hollywood with expanded
space and a lease extension of thirty-seven months.164  A letter of
intent for this lease was submitted to APM, which refused to ap-
prove the transaction.165  When the approval process dragged on,
Reid, a representative of Hollywood, became frustrated and de-
manded a meeting with Weston, the owner of APM.166  After the
meeting, Reid overheard Weston say, “Why should we pay
[Brown] when we’ve done all the work?”167  A short time later,
APM approved the lease, but without the extension, resulting in
a substantial reduction in Brown’s commission.168
156 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1053-54.
157 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1054.
158 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1054.
159 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1054.
160 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1054.
161 Id.  at 56, 1 P.3d at 1054.
162 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judg-
ment to Mr. Brown on whether he was wrongfully terminated under ORS 652.355.
Id.  at 56-60, 1 P.3d at 1054-56.
163 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
164 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
165 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
166 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
167 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
168 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
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Brown alleged that APM acted in bad faith by refusing to ap-
prove the transaction he had negotiated.169  At trial, APM
moved for a directed verdict, arguing they had authority under
their contract with Brown to reject lease proposals.170  The trial
court denied their motion, and a subsequent jury trial resulted in
a verdict for Brown.171
APM appealed, contending that its contract provided them
with discretion, and Brown was not entitled to any pay for leases
APM did not approve.172  The court stated that the law imposes a
duty of good faith into all contracts in order to facilitate the con-
tract in furtherance of the agreed-upon terms or the reasonable
expectations of the parties.173  The court then stated that “even
in cases in which contractual obligations are conditioned on per-
sonal satisfaction, the right to disprove must be exercised in good
faith.”174  The court concluded that Weston’s comment was suffi-
cient evidence of bad faith to uphold the trial court’s denial of
APM’s motion for directed verdict.175
Brown is significant because it appears to break with the hold-
ing in Tolbert , and instead seems to follow the prior good faith
obligation as articulated by the court in Best .  While Tolbert held
that a party exercising its discretion under the express terms of a
contract had satisfied its good faith obligation as a matter of law,
in Brown  the court held otherwise, limiting APM’s apparently
unlimited discretion.
B. Cantua v. Creager176
The Cantua case involved multiple plaintiffs who brought mul-
tiple claims related to the actions of the defendant, Creager.
Creager was the owner of Visual Changes Salon.177  Creager’s
constant sexual and physical harassment and assault of employ-
ees, customers, and contract workers created an unpleasant work
environment.178  Among the many plaintiffs was King,179 a make-
169 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
170 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1057.
171 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1056.
172 Id.  at 62, 1 P.3d at 1056.
173 Id.  at 63, 1 P.3d at 1056.
174 Id.  at 63, 1 P.3d at 1056.
175 Id.  at 63, 1 P.3d at 1056.
176 Cantua v. Creager, 169 Or. App. 81, 7 P.3d 693 (2000).
177 Id.  at 83, 7 P.3d at 695.
178 Id.  at 84-85, 7 P.3d at 696.
179 Id.  at 83, 7 P.3d at 695.
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up tattooist who arranged to work out of the salon, in return for
paying Creager twenty percent of her fees.180  The informal lease
agreement between the two was oral and was never reduced to
writing.181  Since the evidence did not show that King was a vic-
tim of Creager’s unlawful touching, King’s claims centered on the
hostile workplace that was created by Creager’s behavior to-
wards others.182  The trial court dismissed King’s claims.183
The court of appeals affirmed a number of the dismissals based
upon the fact that King did not meet the definition of “em-
ployee.”184  The court then turned to King’s contract claim,
which alleged that Creager failed to comply with the terms of the
parties’ informal lease agreement.185  The court concluded that
King presented sufficient evidence to reach a jury on the issue of
Creager’s alleged breach of good faith and fair dealing, and ac-
cordingly reversed the dismissal of the claim.186
The significance of Cantua is found in the cases that the court
cited in laying out the good faith standard.  The court cited Per-
kins v. Standard Oil187 and Best.188  Nowhere to be found in the
decision was the narrow definition of good faith advanced in
Tolbert .
C. Furrer v. Southwestern Oregon Community College189
Furrer v. Southwestern Oregon Community College  was a class
action brought by employees of Southwestern Oregon Commu-
nity College (SOCC).190  The plaintiffs alleged that in May 1987
SOCC adopted a policy offering benefits to certain early retiring
employees if the school board determined that early retirement
would benefit both the school and the employee.191  In July 1997,
the policy was modified to change some of the eligibility provi-
sions.192  This new policy allowed any employee who was (1)
180 Id.  at 89, 7 P.3d at 699.
181 Id.  at 89, 7 P.3d at 699
182 Id.  at 89-90, 7 P.3d at 699.
183 Id.  at 90, 7 P.3d at 699.
184 Id.  at 94-95, 7 P.3d at 701-02.
185 Id.  at 95, 7 P.3d at 702.
186 Id.  at 97, 7 P.3d at 703.
187 Perkins v. Standard Oil, 235 Or. 7, 383 P.2d 107 (1963).
188 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557, 739 P.2d 554 (1987).
189 Furrer v. Sw. Or. Cmty. Coll., 196 Or. App. 374, 103 P.3d 118 (2004).
190 Id.  at 376, 103 P.3d at 119.
191 Id.  at 376, 103 P.3d at 119.
192 Id.  at 376, 103 P.3d at 119.
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hired before July 1997; (2) had ten years of accumulated service;
(3) was fifty-five years old; and (4) was eligible for retirement
under the state PERS, to request early retirement.193  The deter-
mination of whether an employee was given early retirement was
then in the hands of the SOCC board.194  According to the plain-
tiffs, under the 1997 policy, the board regularly determined that
it was mutually beneficial to approve employee requests for early
retirement.195  The policy was revised again on March 1, 2002.196
The revision changed both the eligibility requirements for early
retirement and the scope of the benefits awarded to employees
who retired early.197
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia , that the 2002 changes to the
policy amounted to a breach of contract by SOCC.198  The trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim
because the court was “convinced that there [was] no legal the-
ory that would support plaintiffs’ argument that a contract could
have been created under the facts they allege.”199  The plaintiffs
then appealed from the judgment of dismissal.200
The Oregon Court of Appeals first addressed the plaintiffs’ as-
sertion that it was an error to dismiss their breach of contract
claim.  The plaintiffs argued that the pre-2002 agreement gave
rise to contractual obligations that SOCC could not unilaterally
modify.201  They claimed that the “mutuality of benefit” provi-
sion in the policy did not render the board’s obligation to con-
sider requests illusory because in its application the board was
subject to the good faith obligation.202  Accordingly, the plaintiffs
argued that the discretion to approve or disapprove requests was
not unfettered.203  SOCC responded by arguing that the pre-2002
policy had no contractual force because its board had total dis-
cretion and that discretion made the promise illusory.204
The court of appeals determined that the dispositive issue was
193 Id.  at 376, 103 P.3d at 120.
194 Id.  at 376-77, 103 P.3d at 120.
195 Id.  at 377, 103 P.3d at 120.
196 Id.  at 377, 103 P.3d at 120.
197 Id.  at 377, 103 P.3d at 120.
198 Id.  at 378, 103 P.3d at 120-21.
199 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
200 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
201 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
202 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
203 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
204 Id.  at 379, 103 P.3d at 121.
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whether SOCC had unlimited discretion to deny early retirement
under the policy, which would make any obligation illusory.205
The court quoted Corbin on Contracts  and stated that a promise
is not illusory when the promisor lacks an unconditional power to
refuse to perform.206  The court then cited its earlier decision in
Wyss v. Inskeep  and stated that if an employer’s discretion in-
cludes the power to deny a benefit, its decision to do so must be
made in good faith.207
The court’s next step, however, is something of a surprise given
the limiting of good faith under Tolbert .  The court held that de-
spite the board’s apparently unlimited discretion under the pol-
icy, the good faith obligation did in fact provide a limit to that
discretion, and that limit was enough to keep the promise from
being illusory.208  In so holding, the court cited Best , without any
reference to Tolbert and its progeny.209
CONCLUSION
The Oregon Supreme Court announced that the purpose of
the good faith doctrine was to prohibit and provide remedy for
improper behavior in the performance and enforcement of con-
tracts.210  Unfortunately, through a string of narrowing decisions
in the 1990s, the court constricted the good faith obligation to the
point that it has become almost completely ineffective in accom-
plishing its rightful purpose: securing equitable and just out-
comes.  Not all hope for a return of the doctrine is lost, however.
Recent decisions from the Oregon Court of Appeals have re-
205 Id.  at 380, 103 P.3d at 121.
206 Id.  at 380, 103 P.3d at 121.
207 Id.  at 380-81, 103 P.3d at 122.
208 Id.  at 381, 103 P.3d at 122.  Because the promise was meaningful, the court
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim. See id.  at 381, 103
P.3d at 122.
209 Id.  at 381, 103 P.3d at 122.  In comparing the Furrer decision with the decision
in Richardson , it appears that the courts are not clear as to the status of good faith in
Oregon. See supra  notes 133-149 and accompanying text.  The same court of ap-
peals judge is the author of both opinions, yet the good faith obligation is given two
different treatments.  In Richardson , the good faith doctrine is not allowed to place
any limitation on the defendant’s actions under the terms of the contract and the
case cited is Uptown Heights .  Richardson v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 161 Or.
App. 615, 624, 984 P.2d 917, 923 (1999).  However, as is mentioned in the text ac-
companying this note, in Furrer , the good faith doctrine is invoked to place a limita-
tion on the party involved, and the case cited is Best .  It is likely time for the Oregon
Supreme Court to reconsider the good faith obligation and clarify the status of the
doctrine.
210 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 303 Or. 557, 562, 739 P.3d 554, 557 (1987).
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verted to the previous formulation of good faith, and have
moved back toward the broad obligation announced in Best .
Will more courts follow this lead?  This is not only a question,
but also a challenge.  A revival of the good faith doctrine will
only be successful if led by the courts.  The rule announced in
Best is more consistent with the purpose of the good faith obliga-
tion’s inclusion in the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second), and
is more consistent with the thirty years of Oregon precedent that
the Tolbert decision ignored.  It is time for Oregon courts to re-
turn to that doctrine, and in the words of former Justice Unis,
“[R]estore vitality to the implied contractual duty of good faith
and fair dealing, consistent with its purpose.”211
211 Uptown Heights Assocs., L.P. v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or. 638, 656, 891 P.2d 639,
649 (1995) (Unis, J., concurring).
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